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Abstract: The article aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on accounting 
conservatism among Nigeria listed firms. Correlational research design was employed in this 
study and the sample size comprises of all 15 firms from the banking sector listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for the years 2013 – 2017. The study employed the panel 
regression technique to estimate the coefficients of the variables in the model specified. 
The study finds that there is a positive and insignificant relationship between managerial 
ownership and accounting conservatism; a positive but an insignificant relationship was 
observed between institutional ownership and accounting conservatism. However, foreign 
ownership revealed a negative but not significant relationship with accounting conservatism. 
We recommend that financial statements to include more detailed analysis of the structure of 
their ownership and shareholding to provide more information for decision making for users 
of the accounting information such as researchers and potential investors. Also, Regulatory 
bodies should ensure all companies comply with the concept of conservatism by imposing 
strict penalty on erring companies.  
Keywords: Accounting Conservatism, Ownership Structure, Nigeria 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The transparency and timeliness of accounting information has become of greater importance in 
financial reporting owing to the rise of globalization and internationalization in the capital markets. 
One of the distinct areas that affects these accounting principles is the idea of conservatism in 
accounting [27]. 
Accounting conservatism can be seen as a method used by firms in reducing the risk in accounting 
reporting that arises from events such as district contracts and implementation of poor decisions [19]. 
The anticipated relationship between ownership structure and accounting conservatism arises from the 
existence of previous literature enumerating a relationship between the knowledge of directors in 
anticipating benefit, delivery time and profitability of projects, and their exposure to such information 
spurring excessively risky investment decisions [3], [35]. 
The goal of accounting conservatism, by means of early loss recognition in financial reporting, is to 
increase the investment profitability of a business [22]. [17]. This postulation is further supported by 
the thoughts of [31] and [3] suggesting that Accounting conservatism revealed a positive effects on 
the success of the decisions made based on accounting information.  Studies have linked the winding 
up of large companies to accounting practices directly opposing the principle of conservatism in the 
years preceding their liquidation [32]. 
Active monitoring theory postulates that institutional shareholders have significant tendencies to 
involve themselves in overseeing management of firms and are often longer term, and so this 
monitoring leads to an enhancement in firm value and quality of accounting data to favor the other 
shareholders and public stakeholders [5]. 
A wide range of literature examined the connection between conservatism in accounting and other 
variables with the use of different models, theorem and research models, and most of such studies 
have been centred on selected variables such as government ownership, agency, agency conflict and 
equity market demand influence.  
 Their findings have indicated a correlation between accounting conservatism and chosen variables in 
developed countries as in the studies of [26] in Malaysian companies, [2] in Jordan, [1] in the United 
States, [8] also in the United states, [6] in the United kingdom, [5] in Korea amongst many others all 
generating mixed results. However, little empirical data exists that investigates the existence and 
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extent of a relationship between apportionment of equity holding in quoted companies and the amount 
of conservatism applied in their financial reporting practices in developing countries specifically in 
Nigeria, and very few have used institutional ownership, managerial ownership and foreign ownership 
as the set of independent variables potentially influencing accounting conservatism. Based on this, the 
study examine the impact of ownership structure on account conservatism in Nigerian quoted firms’.  
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: Section 1 is an introduction as above. 
Section 2 contains the literature review and hypothesis development. Section 3 outlines details of the 
research design adopted. Section 4 presents the results from the estimates and analyses the results. 
Section 5 concludes the study and provides recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
2.1 Concept of Accounting Conservatism 
According to [36] in a general sense, conservatism is a likelihood that accountants, when met with 
uncertain economic conditions in financial transactions, opt to anticipate smaller amounts for the 
worth of assets and revenues, but larger projections for the amounts of liabilities and expenses, the 
aim being to prevent the overstatement of incomes in financial reporting and the understatement of 
costs and losses. 
Conservatism can easily be associated with principle of realisation, in that it encourages that an 
income should not receive recognition prior to its actual realization. This principle as seen by 
contemporary academicians and accounting standard setters, is a concept under which accountants 
apply a sensible amount of prudence in the recognition of transactions that are affected by economic 
uncertainty. 
Modern accounting researchers agree that conservatism has the impact of speeding up the recognition 
of losses and declaration of profit recognition [36]. [36] further argues that this does not imply a 
weakness to the prudency rationale behind conservatism because it appears to simply postpone the 
recognition of incomes, but that it does so only in order to verify the materialization of such incomes 
before they are reported. 
The rationale behind encouraging accounts conservatism is to further confirm the truthfulness of the 
incomes reported in financial statements and eliminate the threat of ghost incomes in the statements 
which may have been earned but were never received and are therefore of no financial benefit to the 
business in question in terms of  their liquidity. [20], [29] in their work, stated that the desire for 
accounts conservatism is encouraged by agency conflicts, citing an example in the idea that varying 
management ownership structures amount to varying agency costs to businesses, and therefore 
varying demands for conservatism. The effect of the agency principle on conservatism rallies around 
the idea that the managers, being the agents of the shareholders for the running of the business have 
little or no personal incentives to be conservative in their reporting ad their investments are not 
involved in the company and to have reported higher profits would imply that they have done a better 
job, hence to apply conservatism in delaying the recognition of the profits will be to their 
disadvantage. [24] further espouse that the differences in the degree of conservatism applied in 
reporting within the same regions imply that the level of conservatism applied is not regional but is 
dependent of the internal goals of financial reporting held valuable by each individual organization 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism 
The empirical evidence on the influence of managerial ownership on accounting conservatism is 
inconclusive with opposing opinions. 
The crux of the agency problem rests in the fact that for the sake of their own interests which are 
separate from those of the stakeholders, managers may make both accounting and real decisions to 
deceive the ownership of the company into making choices to favour them by concealing the true 
state of the firm’s economic performance [23], [34]. 
Depending on the extent to which managers are constrained in accruals manipulation, they may likely 
resort to making such fraudulent adjustments in the area of real earnings management which may be 
even more advantageous to them [14]. In addition to concealing the real performance of the company, 
earnings management hides the true patterns in the companys actual performance in terms of revenue 
and earnings growth which will in turn create an impression that shareholders and the public can 
anticipate improvements in the business growth and demand of its products. 
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According to [23] however, recent literature presents evidence that conservatism can serve as a 
preventive measure on the harm caused by earnings management practices. In support of these claims, 
[16] say that applying conditional conservatism by way of timely recognition of losses and delaying 
economic gains recognition reduces the chances that earnings management will successfully be 
carried out. [33] reported a significant relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism. Also, [2] found a positive association between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism. 
H1: There is no significant relationship between managerial ownership and accounting conservatism 
in Nigeria listed firms. 
2.2.2 Foreign Ownership and Accounting conservatism  
Foreign investors tend to gravitate towards firms with high investments and abundant information 
which they often associate with low levels of information asymmetry [11]; [21]; [20]. Additionally 
they have stronger motives, experience and skill sets to independently analyse companies, and this 
increased monitoring abilities are in turn poised to influence their demand for the accuracy of 
accounting information, and cause them to turn to enforcing more conservatism as a means to 
achieving that end.  
[5] suggested that foreign ownership could either boost or reduce financial reporting quality. Their 
results indicated that foreign ownership is positively associated with financial reporting conservatism 
at all three models. Studies such as [2]; [4] reveal a positive relationship between foreign ownership 
and accounting conservatism. 
H2: There is no significant relationship between foreign ownership and accounting conservatism in 
Nigeria listed firms. 
2.2.3 Institutional ownership and conservatism. 
Institutional shareholders are major professional shareholders and are owners of another part of the 
companys shares, who in spite of the first group, can access to internal valuable information on 
companys future outlook, business strategies through direct relation with managers [28]. [7] 
concluded that using abilities of institutional investors to monitor corporate management and 
performance follows amount of their investment.  
The higher level of institutional ownership, the better management, which it is a direct relationship. 
Theoretically, institutional investors may have incentives for active monitoring on management and 
consequently, increasing shareholders value in comparison with the shareholders with lower 
investments in a company block holders have a larger financial stake in the wellbeing of a company, 
they also pull enough weight through their rights to vote to remove and rearrange the structure of 
management within the company [7]. Large shareholders on the outside therefore possess a lot of 
power to control the behavior of the management and prevent themselves from being victims of the 
agency conflict [37]. 
Institutional investors may have incentives for monitoring financial reporting. Financial statements, 
especially profit and loss statements, are important source about companys information. Empirical 
evidences show that presence of institutional investors has a positive relationship with market reaction 
to dividend distribution [18]. 
[5] posited that institutional investors are best armed with the skills, knowledge and all round 
resources to efficiently and effectively monitor and control the activities of the management in a 
company wherein they have invested. Therefore, the lagers shareholders present an opposition for the 
managers and can prevent them from being able to manipulate profits to levels that best suit their 
interest.   In spite of all this, the heavy involvement of institutional investors in the affairs of a 
company is expensive and will only show its fruits in the long term in the aspect of conservatism, 
therefore not all institutional investors involve themselves in the corporate governance of a company 
[25]. 
Several studies have failed to show how investors that are not part of the board of directors will affect 
the amount of accounting conservatism of the firm. [10] opined that the policy of the firm can be 
affected by the institutional shareholders. They conclude that the policy of the firm can be influence 
through their voting right Conversely, [2], [5] and [4] in their study found a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and accounting conservatism. 
H3: There is no significant relationship between institutional ownership and accounting conservatism 
in Nigeria listed firms. 
2.3 Underpinning Theory 
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2.3.1 Stakeholder theory  
This concept posits that the managers of a company, of ethical necessity, are required to be conscious 
of the effects of their actions on all the parties with a stake in the company. This applies even more 
specifically to the shareholders who are one of the most directly affected by the overall wellbeing of 
the company. [13] defines stakeholders “as any person or group that may or may influenced by the 
accomplishment of the purpose of a corporation”. The term embodies various resource providers 
specifically unions, shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, and regulatory agencies. 
The stakeholder theory was criticized to drastically overemphasize the major role of managers to be 
accountable to stakeholders without stating the way to keep their interests functioning in line with 
each other, but remain relevant as equity demands for conservatism determine the amount of 
conservatism that the managers of companies take due care to present in their financial statements.  
2.3.2 Transient and Active Monitoring Investors theory. 
According to the findings of [9] larger shareholders are more often than not institutional and therefore 
institutions with significant shareholding have a say in the way organizations are run. The effect of 
this can however function in both the positive and negative directions because institutional investors 
come in two different forms, the transient investors with highly diversified portfolios and little interest 
in the management of the firms and short term incentives for investment, heavily dependent on 
accounting information to know when to withdraw their investments from the firms: they are more 
likely to pose a danger to the conservatism in financial reporting because they provide the equity 
demand incentive for managers to manipulate data in order to retain their investment or attract more 
of it. The Active monitoring investors have long term investment intentions with less diversified 
portfolios and a stronger interest in the activities of management. They are more prone to heavy 
monitoring on the management and strict scrutiny on how financial reports are prepared [5], [25] 
This study will be centered on the Stakeholders theory on the basis that it encompasses the debt owed 
by management to its stakeholders the most primary of which being the shareholders) the due caution 
of their interests being considered in the actions taken in the running of the firms in which they have 
entrusted their investment. 
3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Research design 
This research was carried out using correlational research design. This involves the collection of 
previously prepared quantitative data from valid secondary sources about the population and 
performing mathematical operations on them to test the hypothesis. The research was carried out 
within Nigeria. 
3.2 Population and Sample size 
The research population, being the total group of parties to be involved in this study includes all the 
banks in Nigeria quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. There were 15 quoted banking firms in the 
NSE as at 31st December 2017. 
The Judgmental sampling technique was used for this study. Owing to the fact that the population 
being analyzed is very small, the entire population of 15 banks was analyzed in this survey, using data 
from their financial statements from the years 2013 to 2017.  
3.3 Model Specification  
This study draw inspiration from the study [2]. We expect a functional relationship between 
ownership structure (managerial ownership, Institutional ownership, foreign ownership) and 
accounting conservatism. 
 
In econometric form and considering the panel structure of the data, equation one is transformed as: 
ACit =0 +1ForeiOit +2InstOit +3ManOit+ 4sizit + 5profit+ 	it  - - - (2) 
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Source: Authors Computation (2019) 
3.4 Method of Data Analysis 
The analysis of the relevant figures extracted from the financial statements will be carried out first 
with the use of a mathematical formula for the measurement of conservatism, and a panel regression 
model will be adopted for the study to test the hypothesis with the aid of the STATA 13.0 software 
package to establish relationship or absence thereof between accounting conservatism and percentage 
of ownership structure as per the data in the financial statements, reason being the reliability. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
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The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis presented in Table 1 explains the, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviation and mean values of the data distribution. The mean value of 
organization’s conservatism in financial reporting is 4.21e+07. It had a standard deviation of 
4.20e+07, a maximum absolute value of 1.78e+08 and a minimum absolute of value of -1.97e+07 
revealing a large range and by so doing presenting a significant extent of variability in the 
conservatism of the financial statements of the banks.    
The managerial ownership shows a mean of 0.1052354, with maximum and minimum values of 
.71858 and 0 respectively while the standard deviation is .1549379. This means an average of 10 
percent of the shares of quoted banks in Nigeria is held by the management, however there exists a 
significant range in the variance of the percentage in different banks. The foreign ownership showed 
an average of.1776166, with maximum and minimum values of   .8589 and 0 respectively while the 
standard deviation is .2460458. This implies that the average quoted bank in Nigeria is 18% owned by 
foreign investors although the range of differences to extent of this ownership is very wide. The 
institutional ownership has a mean value of .4376009, indicating that nearly half of the quoted 
banking industry is owned by institutions which is in agreement with the postulation that institutions 
possess the large funds required to make large share purchases in companies, or at least, more so than 
individuals. It has a standard deviation of .2641433, with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 1 
respectively.  
The Firm Size, a control variable in the analysis has a mean of 12.11552 and a standard deviation of 
.3373502 with a maximum value of and a minimum value of 12.67576 and 11.06684 respectively. 
Profit as computed in the financial statements is the second control variable with a mean of 3.20e+07 
and a standard deviation of 3.60e+07, as well as a maximum and minimum values of 1.67e+08 and -
2.26e+07 respectively. 
Robustness test 
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Figure 1: Test for Normality (Histogram) 
Computed output (STATA 2019) 
The table above shows the frequency distribution of the data analyzed presented as a histogram. The 
series range is separated into a number of equal length intervals and a count of the number of 
observations in the sample that lie within the intervals is presented by the histogram. Normality is said 
to exist when the outcomes of the observations are normally distributed, that is they take the expected 
bell shape, larger in the middle and tapering down toward the left and right. In this study however, the 
peak of the curve leans toward the left indicating some abnormality in the distribution, hence the 
assumption of normality can be said to have been significantly violated. However the extent of 
violation does not completely negate the premises that the score from the analysis are related. In order 
to further verify the normalcy of the data distribution, normal Q-Q plot tests will be carried out. 
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Normal Q-Q plot affords a graphical way to ascertain the extent of normality. The dotted line 
indicates the tenets that data ought to ideally align with if the distribution is normal. As shown, most 
of the sample does not align with the line, and so the distribution is not normal. 
4.2  Correlation Matrix 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Computed output (STATA, 2018) 
The correlation between account conservatism and managerial ownership revealed a negative 
relationship indicated by -0.2848 shown in the table 2. This implies that an increase in managerial 
ownership will lead to a reduction in conservatism. 
The association between accounts conservatism and managerial ownership is a negative relationship 
indicated by -0.2634 shown in the table 2. This implied that an increase in foreign ownership, will 
lead to a reduction in account, but for the purpose of hypothesis testing, the regression analysis will be 
used. 
    FIRMSIZE     0.7668  -0.3568  -0.1829  -0.2845   0.7197   1.0000
      PROFIT     0.9605  -0.2804  -0.2753  -0.3426   1.0000
     INSTOWN    -0.3308  -0.1464   0.3821   1.0000
      FOROWN    -0.2634   0.0174   1.0000
      MANOWN    -0.2848   1.0000
CONSERVATISM     1.0000
                                                                    
               CONSER~M   MANOWN   FOROWN  INSTOWN   PROFIT FIRMSIZE
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The association between accounts conservatism and firm size is a strongly positive one with the 
coefficient of correlation being 0.9605 as shown in the table 2, which by implication indicates that as 
profit increases, so does conservatism. But for the purpose of testing the hypothesis, regression 
analysis will be later applied. 
The association between accounts conservatism and institutional ownership is a negative relationship 
indicated by -0.3308 shown in the table 2. This means that as the institutional ownership increases, the 
conservatism reduces, but for the purpose of hypothesis testing, the regression analysis will be used. 
The association between account conservatism and firm size according to the results of the correlation 
analysis are strongly positive with a correlation coefficient of 0.7668, implying that there is a positive 
relationship between firm size and accounts conservatism. 
4.3 The Hausman tests. 
This was carried out to establish whether or not a fixed or random effects model will be used to carry 
out the final regression analysis upon which the hypotheses testing will be based. The decision rule 
from the test is that if the difference in coefficients is systematic, then a random effects model is to be 
used, but if the difference in coefficients is systematic then a fixed effects model should be used for 
the data analysis.  
 
Computed output (STATA, 2019) 
Based on the decision rule for Hausman data testing, the observations will be analyzed using a 
random effects model for multiple regression, the results of which will be the premise for the final 
hypothesis testing. The result shows that the correlated Hausman random-effect likelihood value 
(0.6480) exceeds 5 percent (0.05). The random effect model is therefore accepted as the grounds for 
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4.4 Regression Analysis 
 
4.5 Test of Hypothesis and Discussion 
From the table above, the P>|z| (Prob) value for managerial ownership is 0.723 which is far above the 
significance level of 5% which is being used in this work. Although the slope of the coefficient is a 
positive value of 1.11e+07, the basis of analysis rests more importantly on the probability value, 
hence the null hypothesis is accepted over the alternative hypothesis. On the basis of the probability 
therefore, managerial ownership has no significant relationship with accounting conservatism. This is 
consistent with the ideas of [12] who advocate that managers use financial reporting discretion to 
manage earnings in both directions in order to satisfy their own goals. Including management in the 
shareholding of a company can therefore swing both ways in either improving or reducing accounts 
conservatism, an indices of earnings quality.  
The result from the above table also revealed, the P>|z| (Prob) value for foreign ownership is 0.914 
which exceeds the significance level of 5% being applied for this analysis. The slope of the coefficient 
value is –655225.8, which shows a significant negativity, the decision is however being taken on the 
probability which clearly exceeds 0.05, and is therefore the null hypothesis will be accepted and the 
alternative hypothesis rejected. By implication, this result implies that variations in foreign ownership 
do not affect the extent of accounting conservatism applied in the preparation of financial reports in 
the banking sector. This result is supported by the postulations of [30] attributing variations in 
incentives for accounts conservatism to ownership concentration and not nature of ownership. By 
implication, it is the unity of incentive of the largest shareholder group to influence management 
decisions that matters and not the size of the groups. The studies of [6] acknowledge that there are 2 
groups of investors, the transient and the active monitoring investors, the transient ones being passive 
and readily willing to sell off their investments in a sudden turn of market conditions and the active 
monitoring ones with long run incentives to maintain their shareholding in the company. Hence, 
subject to the nature of foreign investors, the impact on conservatism could be both positive and 
negative, suggesting a likely reason for the absence of a significant relationship.  
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The P>|z| (Prob) value for institutional ownership is 0.796, which is clearly above the significance 
level of 5% being used in this research. The slope of the coefficient was a strong positive 1556272, 
but the decision rule rests on the probability hence the reason for accepting the null hypothesis, 
meaning in real terms that variations in the proportions of institutional ownership in listed banks in 
Nigeria has no effect on the level of accounting conservatism. This is in consistent with the theory of 
Transient and the Active Monitoring investors [25]. The transient investors due to their short run 
incentives and investment volatility, rather than monitor managers, sell their investments as soon as 
the market turns unfavourable, hence the incentive for the management to manipulate data increases 
in order to keep the transient investors happy. However, with the active monitoring investors, keen 
attention is paid to the management of the company because they have long term intentions to 
maintain their investment in such companies, hence the demand more conservatism in their financial 
reporting. 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study was driven by the premise that the structure of the organizations ownership has an 
influence on the reliability of its financial statements, in this case being measured by accounting 
conservatism. The aim is to provide additional data to back up the reliability of financial statements 
by way of the ownership structure informing the viewer of annual reports on how reliable/ 
conservative the financial statements of the company will likely be, and for individual investors with 
small financial capability and hence little power to influence management, it can be helpful in 
deciding where is safest to invest. 
Based on the above analysis, data collection, reviews of literature and interpretation of data, among 
the quoted banks in the Nigerian Stock Exchange, there is no significant relationship between 
ownership structure of firms (specifically managerial, foreign and institutional ownership) and 
accounting conservatism. Although many literatures support the presence of relationships between 
these variables and accounting conservatism, for probable reasons, some of which have been stated 
above, a relationship between those variables is not traceable in the observations collected from the 
financial statements in the industry.  
Consequently, based on the findings, the study recommends that in assessing the tendency of 
ownership structure and accounting conservatism, there is need for: 
Financial statements to include more detailed analysis of the structure of their ownership and 
shareholding to provide more information for decision making for users of the accounting information 
such as researchers and potential investors.  
Also, more attention should be placed on accounting conservatism by regulatory bodies as a means of 
improving the quality of earnings reported by companies.  
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